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Paul D. Paton*

Accountants, Privilege, and the
Problem of Working Papers

Full and frank disclosure between corporate issuers and their auditors and
accounting advisors is critical for maintaining access to the information required
for audits and public confidence in the capital markets. While tax authorities in the
United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have the power
to make broad requests for working papers, in all four jurisdictions, legislation
or administrative practice reflects the determination that the best approach for
balancing tax and capital markets requirements is for the revenue authorities
to seek working papers only in exceptional circumstances. Additionally, limited
forms of privilege for accountants have been recognized in all four jurisdictions.
In contrast, Canada Revenue Agency practices require broad disclosure of
corporate information and working papers. This paper suggests that the result
of CRA practice is to restrict access for auditors to information necessary for the
assessment of financial statements and required by capital markets. It argues that
by driving corporations to seek tax advice from lawyers rather than accountants,
CRA paradoxically is creating an environment where less information, not more, is
available for tax authorities. The author proposes that the CRA adopt a policy of
requesting working papers and information only in exceptional and well-defined
circumstances. Such a policy would accord with recent corporate governance
reforms aimed at encouraging more open and transparent financial reporting,
and would bring Canadian practice in this area into step with recent international
developments.

La divulgation complete et franche entre les soci~t6s 6mettrices,leurs v~rificateurs
et leurs conseillers comptables est cruciale pour preserver I'acces a I'information
n6cessaire aux vdrifications et, par consequent, la confiance du public dans
les march6s financiers. Quoique les administrations fiscales aux Etats-Unis, en
Australie, en Nouvelle-Zelande et au Royaume-Uni ont le pouvoir de faire des
demandes 6largies pour des documents de travail, dans les quatre pays les
lois ou les pratiques administratives refletent la d6termination que la meilleure
fagon de respecter I'6quilibre entre les exigences fiscales et celles des march6s
financiers est pour les administrations fiscales les pratiques de IAgence du
revenu du Canada (ARC) exigent la divulgation exhaustive des renseignements
relatifs j une soci6t6 et de ses documents de travail. Lauteur conclut que les
methodes absolues pratiqu6es par IARC ont pour r~sultat un acc~s limits, pour
les verificateurs, aux renseignements n6cessaires a I'examen des 6tats financiers
et requis par les march~s financiers. De plus, en forgant les soci~t6s J demander
des conseils d'ordre fiscal 6 des avocats plut6t qu'a des comptables, IARC
cree, paradoxalement, un environnement oi) les administrations fiscales ont
acces j moins plut5t qu'a plus de renseignements. L'auteur propose que IARC
adopte une politique pr6voyant qu'il soit permis de demander la communication
des documents de travail et de certains renseignements uniquement dans des
circonstances exceptionnelles et bien d6finies. Une telle politique s'accorderait
avec les r6centesr6formes apportees a la r6gie d'entreprise qui visent6 encourager
des rapports financiers plus ouverts et plus transparents, et elle adapterait les
pratiques canadiennes aux r6cents d~veloppements internationaux.
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Introduction
At the Canadian Tax Foundation Tax Conference in Toronto on September
28, 2004, representatives of the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) stated
that CRA would be conducting a broad-based consultation with the tax,
accounting, and business communities about clarifications to CRA's
policy regarding their access to accountants' and auditors' working
papers, particularly those dealing with the analysis of tax provisions or tax
liabilities.1 CRA's announcement came on the heels of anecdotal reports
of general requests by certain CRA offices for audit working papers as
a matter of routine, an apparent change in CRA administrative practice.
While CRA authority to initiate broad requests for information from
accountants is clearly authorized under the Income Tax Act, 2 the practice
has the potential to serve as an impediment to efforts by accountants and
auditors to facilitate responsible and legitimate disclosure within the selfreporting tax system.

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University. I acknowledge with thanks the helpful
comments of Prof. Kim Brooks, Faculty of Law, UBC, and Prof. Art Cockfield, Faculty of Law,
Queen's University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Law's Empire/Canadian Law
& Society Conference in June 2005 with financial assistance from a grant from the Office of Research
Services at Queen's University. I have also had the benefit of input from the Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants Task Force on Audit Working Papers and Confidentiality (Larry F. Chapman,
FCA, Chair), for which I served as Research Director. Responsibility for the contents of the paper and
any errors remains my own.
1.
"Canada Revenue Agency Round Table," in Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Tax
Conference [2004] (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2005) 5A:l at 5A:5-6.
2.
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, s. 231 [Income Tax Act]. See also.the discussion of Kirsch,
infra, 378-382.
*
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Further, by implementing a practice of broad requests for information,
CRA has put Canada out of step with recent developments in Australia, the
United States, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, all of which have
limited the ability of tax authorities to seek disclosure of information from
taxpayers except in clear and well-defined special circumstances. Those
countries have recognized the integral relationship between tax policy and
corporate governance practice, and have arrived at compromise solutions
that preserve the ability of auditors to help ensure open and transparent
financial reporting. The use by CRA of its broad powers to question auditors
and accountants about their clients' subjective intentions and to obtain
access to documents and information is in essence creating a paradox:
auditors are being held to much higher standards of accountability for the
accuracy of financial information being provided to capital markets than
ever before, yet, if left unchecked, CRA practices are creating disincentives
for clients to be open in speaking with their auditors and non-lawyer
advisors.
The paradox is particularly significant in relation to audit working
papers. Recent developments in auditing standards require that more
information be kept in the working paper files to justify audit opinions
for financial reporting purposes in capital markets. If CRA routinely
seeks access to accountants' and auditors' working papers, as recent CRA
practice and policy suggest, clients will be reluctant to disclose information
to auditors for financial reporting purposes that could be exposed in a
tax audit. As a result, there will be a negative impact on the quality of
information available to conduct the audit, and, in turn, there will be less
information available to capital markets. If Australia and the United States,
in particular, have found a working balance between capital markets and
tax system imperatives, surely Canadian authorities ought to be able to do
the same.
The proverbial "elephant in the corner" in this discussion is privilege.
Lawyers in Canada have it, accountants do not, and the decision of the
Federal Court of Appeal in Kitsch3 has unleashed the threat not only that
CRA will be able to engage in expansive documentary requests from
taxpayers' accountants, but also to demand responses from accountants
about their clients' intentions. If CRA policy continues in its present
direction, the inevitable result will be the flight of taxpayers to lawyers
rather than accountants for tax advice, ironically resulting in the availability
of less information to CRA auditors, not more.

3.
Tower v. M.N.R., [2004] 1 F.C.R. 183 (C.A.), overturning Tower v. M.N.R., [2003] 2. F.C 146
(T.D.) (Kitsch).
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This article sets out current CRA practice on audit working papers and
demands for information. It details international developments critically
relevant to CRA policy and Canadian competitiveness, and seeks to offer
a principled rationale for limiting CRA requests for access to auditor and
accountant working papers to exceptional circumstances such as instances
of fraud or misrepresentation. In a self-reporting system, it is evident that
CRA requires access to source documents related to transactions or events
linked to the determination of tax liability. Working papers, however, do
not constitute evidence of these transactions and are not directly relevant
to the determination of a corporation's tax liability under the Income Tax
Act. Implementing broad requests for papers will serve as an impediment
to efforts by accountants and auditors to facilitate responsible and
legitimate disclosure within the self-reporting system and could well lead
to the adoption by companies of protocols that would endeavor to cloak
with privilege procedures leading to estimates of tax liabilities. The end
result would be litigation over those procedures and a less efficient and
transparent system, an outcome contrary to the directions of other recent
reforms. Further, it will drive Canada away from harmonization of its
efforts with Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. These
are countries with which it has announced major initiatives to promote tax
integrity and CRA thus far has articulated no rationale for diverging from
them.4
I. Background: working papers and CRA policy
In Canada, "working papers" is a term of art, so some description of them is
important for understanding this issue. In the context of an audit, working
papers addressing the analysis of the tax provision or tax liabilities are,
in essence, those which reflect the estimate of a company's tax provision
or liabilities. The papers may be created within the organization, or by
an outside auditor or advisor in cooperation with management. Certain
elements of the tax provision are readily quantified, while others require
judgments estimating the impact of identified or non-identified tax results.
Working papers prepared by the auditor reflect the auditor's views in
fulfilling its responsibility to probe, question and exercise its professional
judgment for the purpose of forming an opinion on the company's financial
statements. These papers are not the same as working papers generated in
connection with the preparation of the company's annual tax return.

4.
For example, the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (JITSIC) in partnership
with Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, discussed further below and in Canada
Revenue Agency, "Aggressive International Tax Planning Centres of Expertise," August 2005, online:
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/newsroom/factsheets/2005/aug /050823-e.html>.
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In recent U.S. corporate governance reforms, in particular the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 and rules promulgated under it by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), "work papers" have been
defined as "documentation of auditing or review procedures applied,
evidence obtained, and conclusions reached by the accountant in the audit
or review engagement, as required by standards established or adopted by
the [SEC] or by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board."' 6 The
relevant SEC Final Rule Release notes that section 802 of the SarbanesOxley Act was intended to require more than what was traditionally
thought of as an auditor's "work papers," and explains that the definition
adopted accords with an understanding of the documents required to be
retained under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS).7 Different
definitions have been applied to delineate different kinds of work papers
relevant to tax provisioning in the United States. A 2004 Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) document, discussed further below, categorizes work papers
typically prepared for publicly traded corporations into three groups and
provides detailed definitions of "audit work papers," "tax accrual work
papers," and "tax reconciliation work papers." 8 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requirements mandate that auditors of publicly listed companies require
appropriate documentation to substantiate a tax provision. Key schedules,
reconciliations or similar source documents pertaining to significant issues
in the audit need to be retained. That is so even if they are not otherwise
necessary for inclusion in the audit file because they constitute financial
information received in the course of the audit that is considered relevant
to the audit or review of an SEC registrant or its subsidiary. The document
retention requirements and the related need to be independently satisfied of
material inputs into the financial statements of the company being audited
have meant a transformation in approach to the audit and have imposed
new and significant obligations. 9
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is a
private, non-profit corporation established in the United States pursuant

5.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [Sarbanes-OxleyAct].
6.
17 CFR Part 210, ss210.2-06(1)(b) [Release Nos. 33-8180; 34-47241;.]C-25911;.FR-66; File
No. S7-46-02].
7.
Ibid. at p. 5.
8.
US Intemal Revenue Service, "IRM Par 4 Examining Process, Chapter 10 Examination
of Returns, Section 20 [I.R.M. 4.10.20] Requesting Audit, Tax Accrual, or Tax Reconciliation
Workpapers," online: <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tawpirm07O9O4 checked.doc> [I.R.M. 4.10.20]
at 4.10.20.2.
9.
See, for example, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Bylaws and Rules - Standards
-AS 3, Auditing Standard No. 3 -Audit Documentation, June 9, 2004, online: <http://www.pcaobus.
org/Rules of theBoard/Documents/Rules of the Board/AuditingStandard3.pdf$>. Note that these
obligations have implications beyond U.S. borders.
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to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It has as its mission the oversight of public
company audits, the protection of the interests of investors, and the
furtherance of "the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair and
independent audit reports."1 As part of its mandate the PCAOB registers
and inspects all accounting firms that issue or prepare audit opinions on the
financial statements of U.S. companies and, where necessary, investigates
and disciplines such firms. Foreign-based firms, including Canadian ones,
are affected as the PCAOB has not excluded them from registration or
inspection, regardless of whether and how they are registered and inspected
under their domestic jurisdictional regimes." PCAOB claims an expansive
right to review audit work papers in conducting inspections of audit firms,
a critical part of its mandate.' 2 Given that audit documentation is required
to satisfy PCAOB requirements and to support public interest and trust in
audited financial reports (especially post-Enron), the U.S. tax authorities
have exercised restraint in seeking access to such documentation for tax
purposes. Their position is remarkable yet consistent with the primary
purpose of the documentation created: the audit of the company's financial
statements.
Traditionally, CRA's policy in respect of working papers was that
requests to examine them would not be "routine." Indeed, the following
exchange from the Revenue Canada Round Table at the 1979 Canadian Tax
Foundation Annual Conference concerning CRA policy is representative:
Question 34
Access to Public Accountants' Files
Some of our correspondents have stated that some assessors have
routinely requested the auditors to provide their audit files for inspection.
What is the Department's policy on this matter?
Department's Position
It is not the policy or practice of the Department routinely to request audit
files from accountants for inspection. Normally, any such request would
result only when the auditor's files form part of the taxpayer's records
and a proper examination could not be carried out without access to those
10. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, "Our Mission", online: <http://www.pcaobus.
org> [home page].
11. For a discussion of the PCAOB's view with respect to its regulation of non-U.S. auditors, see
Daniel L. Goelzer, "The PCAOB and the Oversight of Non-U.S. Auditors," [Speech text], April 19,
2004, online: <http://www.pcaobus.org/News and events/Events/transcripts/2004-04-19_Goelzer.
asp>.
12. For a discussion of the PCAOB's approach to inspections, see Daniel L. Goelzer, "The Work of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and its Impact on Tax Services," Luncheon Address
at the Advanced Forum on Global Transfer Pricing American Conference Institute, November 10,
2004, online: <http://www.pcaobus.org/NewsandEvents/Events/transcripts/2004-11-16_Daniel_
GoelzerSpeech.asp>. The rules on inspections are online: <http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules-of the
Board/Documents/Rules of theBoard/all.pdf!' [Section 4-Inspections, Rules 4000-4012].
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files. The more complete and sophisticated that a taxpayer's records are,
the less the necessity for examination of audit files. However, in each
case, the decision as to whether or not there is a need to request access to
an auditor's records will depend upon the judgment of the assessor and/
or his supervisor. The powers given to the Minister - and through him his
employees - under the Income Tax Act encompass and are not abused by
such requests. Usually the request will be made by the assessor during
his examination without recourse to a formal requirement as provided by
13
subsection 231(3) of the Act.

This issue has arisen on a number of occasions since then with essentially
the same response from Canadian tax authorities.14 The approach that
auditor or accountant working papers not be routinely requested has been
set out in CRA guidelines for obtaining information from accountants.
Those guidelines provide that CRA will request the production of specific
working papers when necessary to reconcile client records or where they
contain closing or balancing adjustments relevant to tax returns. The
guidelines also provide, however, that "it is not the policy of the CCRA to
request a general access to accountant's working papers for the purpose of
scrutinizing them in the course of conducting an audit."' 5
The guideline approach recognized the inherent tension between an
auditor's need to access all relevant tax information for the purposes of
preparing an audit ofthe company's financial statements, and the legitimate
desire of the company to protect communications with its professional
advisors (in particular, its accountants) in addressing its need for tax advice,
with the benefit of privilege if possible. Corporate statutes mandating
audits also provide the auditor with a statutory right to access information
necessary to conduct an effective audit.16 There is common law precedent

13. Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-First Tax Conference, 1979,
"Revenue Canada Round Table," 631-632.
14. See Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of the Proceedings of the 4 2 1dTax Conference, 1990,
"Revenue Canada Round Table," 50:32-50:33:
1) It is the department's general practice to request that accountants produce specific
working papers for examination where those papers can reasonably be considered to
be an extension of the client's records. In accordance with section 23 1.1 of the Act, the
department expects accountants to produce these working papers upon request. There has
been no change to this practice.
2) Where there is good reason to believe that additional relevant information, including
tax-planning documentation, is in the possession of the accountant, and that information
has not been provided in response to informal and formal written requests, a requirement
under section 231.2 may be issued. Requests for tax-planning documentation are normally
limited to circumstances in which the intention or purpose is crucial. This situation usually
arises in the context of possible application of anti-avoidance provisions of the Act.
15. CRA Investigation Manual IM-11 Part-2 Tax, TOM 11.3.6(2) - "Guidelines for Obtaining
Information from Accountants."
16. See, for example, the CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s.170.
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from Alberta, recently confirmed in Ontario, for the position that privilege
can be maintained over documents disclosed to an auditor to the extent
that 1) such disclosure is mandated by statute; 2) the disclosure is for the
limited purpose of the audit; and 3) there is no intention on the part of the
company making the disclosure to waive privilege over the document being
disclosed. 7 The extent of this protection, however, is limited; a corporation
can turn over a privileged document to its auditors to comply with its
statutory obligations without waiving privilege only over that particular
document. The protection applies to a limited number of working papers
and does not extend to the broad range of other information or documents a
taxpayer might disclose to its auditors that should also remain confidential
between accountant and client. Accordingly, if companies fear that better
protection over sensitive information or documentation is required, they
will be driven towards attempting to limit auditor access to privileged and
other information. Where auditor access is provided, one response may
be to restrict the notes and records that auditors keep from such reviews.
Accordingly, where CRA requests and policies generate concern about
leaving unprivileged documentation in a file, the practices adopted will
make the work of the accountants performing the statutory audits more
difficult.
The CRA's position logically will encourage companies to obtain
tax advice under the cloak of legal privilege, from their lawyers rather
than their accountants. 8 This will have an impact on the auditor oversight
function performed by the Canadian Public Accountability Board
(CPAB). The creation of CPAB was announced in July 2002 by federal
and provincial financial and securities regulators, together with Canada's
chartered accountants, as a new independent public oversight system for
accountants and accounting firms that audit reporting issues. The federal
Department of Finance described CPAB as providing:
a new, national system of oversight for public accounting firms and their
auditors who audit public companies. The CPAB will inspect audit firms
and review adherence to standards applicable to public company auditors.
It will impose penalties directly on audit firms and refer disciplinary
17. InterprovincialPipe Line v. MN.R., [1996] 1 F.C. 367 (T.D.); more recently, see PhilipServices
Corp. (Receiver oj) v. Ontario Securities Commission, [2005] O.J. No. 4418, (2005) 77 O.R. (3d) 209
(Ont. S.C.J. - Div. Ct.) overturning Cineplex Odeon Corp. v. Canada(Minister of NationalRevenue,
Taxation), [1994] O.J. No. 628, 114 D.L.R. (4th) 141 (Ont. Gen. Div.) and effectively confirming the
Interprovincialapproach. The Philip Services case was decided, though, in a non-tax and Ontariospecific context. See Carman R. McNary, "When Audit Obligations Conflict with Rights to Privilege
- Who Wins?" CCH Tax Topics Number 1763-64, December 22, 2005; also Bradley Davis, "Decision
explores protection of solicitor-client documents shared with auditors" The Lawyer s Weekly (January
27, 2006) at 10.
18. The issue of privilege is discussed further below.
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matters relating to individual auditors to the relevant provincial institute
or association of professional accountants. The Board will also make
recommendations on accounting standards, assurance standards, rules
of professional conduct, and governance practices to the relevant
professional institutes or standard-setting bodies.19
CPAB's stated purpose is to promote high quality external audits of public
companies in Canada, and its establishment was important to ensure
the confidence of the Canadian public and international investors in the
functioning of Canadian capital markets.20 Indeed, in March 2004 the
Canadian Securities Administrators approved National Instrument 52-108
(Auditor Oversight) which contained a rule requiring auditors of reporting
issuers to be CPAB members in good standing.2' If an auditor has required
that a client disclose a legal opinion pursuant to its statutory authority
and the client seeks to maintain privilege, disclosure by the auditor to a
third party such as CPAB could possibly negate that privilege. As CPAB
and its auditor oversight function are new, there is as yet no guidance on
this issue of privilege in the auditor oversight context. In its October 6,
2004 report on Initial Quality Inspections of the Four Largest Accounting
Firms, CPAB complained about the restriction on its access to information
because of claims of legal privilege, and further noted that it was seeking
statutory authority to obtain access to privileged information in the context
of its auditor oversight function "without the privilege attaching to that
information being negated." 22
Accordingly, any CRA policy regarding access to working papers
must not be considered in isolation. As the CPAB statement indicates, the
potential impact on the audit function of an increased resort to privilege
is not simply theoretical musing. International experience indicates that
policies about tax authorities' access to working papers need to be assessed
in light of any impact that they will have on the ability of auditors to access
information relevant to the financial statements of a company. A diminished
audit function will have a negative effect on the proper functioning of the

19. See Department of Finance (Canada), "Fostering Investor Confidence in Canadian Capital
Markets," September 10, 2003, online: <http://www.fin.ge.ca/toce/2003/fosteringe.html>.
20. See the CPAB website: <http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca>.
21. On June 27, 2003, the Canadian Securities Administrators released a draft rule that would
require auditors of reporting issuers to be members in good standing of CPAB. National Instrument
52-108 (Auditor Oversight) implementing such a rule was approved on March 9, 2004 in Ontario and
came into force on March 30, 2004. See online: <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/
Current/Part5/rule 20040326 52-108-aud-oversight.jsp>.
22. Canadian Public Accountability Board, "Public Report on Initial Quality Inspections of the Four
Largest Accounting Firms," October 6, 2004, paragraph 16, online: <http://www.cpab-ccrc.ca/dbdocs/
41636b335f6cc.pdf>.
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Canadian capital markets and both domestic and international investor
confidence.
CRA officials also have not articulated a coherent rationale for
maintaining a policy inconsistent both with developments internationally,
and with its previous restraint in accessing working papers. A retreat by
CRA officials into a posture of unfettered, broad access by tax auditors to
all working papers would be inconsistent with domestic and international
efforts to encourage accountability and transparency in both the tax system
and the capital markets. The guidance from recent international efforts in
Australia, the United States, New Zealand and the United Kingdom points
towards a compromise that CRA officials should formally adopt.
II. Internationalperspectives
Corporate governance reform and the efficient functioning of the tax system
are matters of international concern. Canada has recognized this, and has
participated formally with tax authorities in the United States, Australia
and the United Kingdom in international efforts to share best practices and
to encourage collaboration and the coordination of information. Indeed,
at the same September 28, 2004 Canadian Tax Foundation Roundtable
at which the question of a review of the audit working papers policy was
raised, CRA representatives spoke of Canada's formal involvement in an
international joint task force on tax shelters. They referred to a formal
Memorandum of Understanding signed in April 2004 with Australia, the
United States and the United Kingdom establishing the Joint International
Tax Shelter Information Centre in Washington, D.C. They also refered to a
task force goal of increased cooperation on tax transactions "perceived as
abusive. '23 Accordingly, international developments dealing with auditors'
and accountants' working papers are relevant and instructive for Canadian
policymakers.
In particular, the approaches adopted by the IRS in the United States
and by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) to the classification of working
papers, and their policies of self-imposed restraint in seeking access to
working papers only in very limited circumstances provide an appropriate
balance between relevant disclosure and the preservation of the need
for open communication between client and accountant or auditor. The
principles underlying these Australian and American approaches similarly

23. "Canada Revenue Agency Round Table," in Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Tax
Conference [2004] (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2005), supra note 1, 5A:1 at 5A:7-8; the
Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (JITSIC) is discussed further in Canada Revenue
Agency, Income Tax - Technical News No 32., July 29, 2005, online: <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/
E/pub/tp/itnews-32/itnews-32-e.html#Pl17_16255>; and in Canada Revenue Agency, "Aggressive
International Tax Planning Centres of Expertise," supranote 4.
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inform the steps taken in the United Kingdom as well as in New Zealand.
In June 2005, New Zealand formally recognized a form of statutory
privilege for accountants in order to assist taxpayers to obtain candid and
independent advice and to promote voluntary compliance.24 Developments
in the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand are
each considered in the next section.
1. United States
The approach of the IRS to the disclosure of work papers has generally
been one of voluntary "self-restraint." Concerns about tax shelter activity
have led to the development in the United States of special protocols
in respect of "listed transactions," clearly identified by the IRS and
publicized as being transactions in that exceptional category. The exercise
of voluntary restraint regarding documentary demands and production
is suspended for those transactions; this is consistent with the additional
scrutiny with which the IRS views such transactions. The IRS also requires
specific identification and filings regarding them. In contrast to the present
Canadian approach, the general standard pertaining to requests in the
United States for audit or tax accrual work papers is that such papers will
be sought only in "unusual circumstances." It is noteworthy that the IRS
has a broad authority to examine all working papers as a result of prior
2
U.S. jurisprudence. 1
On July 9, 2004, Internal Revenue Service Large and Mid-Sized
Business (LMSB) Commissioner Deborah M. Nolan released new
Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) guidance on requesting tax accrual work
papers, with changes designed to address particular concerns about tax
shelter abuse in the United States. 6 IRM Section 4.10.20 divides work
papers typically prepared for publicly traded corporations and other large
collectively owned entities into three categories:

24. The New Zealand Parliament passed the Taxation (Base Maintenance and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 2005 [2005 No. 79] on 15 June 2005, and the Act received Royal Assent 21 June
2005 [NZAct]. See the discussion infra, 376-378. The limited forms of privilege in the United States
and the United Kingdom are discussed on pages 366-367 and 374-376 respectively. For detail on its
introduction and background, see Taxation (Base Maintenance and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill,
16 November 2004, online: <http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/files/bills/23 Ibarl.pdf>;
see also Hon Dr. Michael Cullen, Minister of Finance, Minister of Revenue (NZ), Taxation (Base
Maintenanceand Miscellaneous Provisions)Bill, Commentaryon the Bill, 16 November 2004, online:
<http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/files/novbill04comm.pdf>.
25. U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
26. Deborah M. Nolan, Commissioner, Large and Mid-Size Business Division, Department of the
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service "Memorandum for Large and Mid-Size Business Division," July
9, 2004, online: <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utllmemol .pdf>.
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1. Tax reconciliation accounts in the work papers;
2. Audit working papers (defined in IRM 4.10.20.2), created by or
for the independent auditor, providing support for the fairness
opinion;
3. "Tax accrual workpapers," defined in the IRM to include "those
audit workpapers, whether prepared by the taxpayer, the taxpayer's
accountant or the independent auditor, that relate to the tax reserve
for current, deferred and potential or contingent tax liabilities";
more simply put, those working papers containing details of
reserves and deferred tax calculations.
With respect to the first category, disclosure is the norm. Tax
reconciliation work papers are to be requested as a "routine" matter at
the beginning of an examination and ordinarily come from the taxpayer,
though access may be sought from the taxpayer's accountants.
For the other two categories, IRS requests for audit work papers and
tax accrual work papers are rare and are to be made under the "unusual
circumstances standard." "Unusual circumstances" exist when a specific
issue is identified by an IRS examiner in an audit for which additional
facts are needed; the examiner has sought from the taxpayer and available
third parties all the facts known to them relating to the identified issue;
and the examiner has sought some supplementary analysis of the issue, not
necessarily contained in the work papers of facts relating to the identified
issue.27 In 2004 guidance about the "unusual circumstances standard," the
IRS noted:
Examiners should keep in mind that the taxpayer's records are the
primary source of factual data to support the tax return. Audit or tax
accrual workpapers should normally be sought only when such factual
data cannot be obtained from the taxpayer's records or from available
third parties, and then only as a collateral source for factual data. Audit
or tax accrual workpapers should be requested with discretion and not
as a matter of standard examining procedure.... The request should be
limited to the portion of the workpapers that is material and relevant
to the examination. Whether an item is considered to be material is
based upon the examiner's28judgment and an evaluation of the facts and
circumstances of the case.
The 2004 guidance is consistent with the IRS approach for about the
previous twenty years. Although the United States Supreme Court

27. Defined in I.R.M. 4.10.20.3.1(2) ("Unusual Circumstances Standard"). For further discussion of
the Unusual Circumstances Standard and its application, see Internal Revenue Service, "Tax Accural
Workpapers Frequently Asked Questions - July 28, 2005," online: <http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/article/0,,id=146242,00.html>.
28. Ibid.
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recognized the right of the IRS to obtain tax accrual work papers in its 1984
decision in United States v. Arthur Young, 29 the IRS announced at the time
that it would continue a policy of "restraint" and would not request such
work papers as part of a standard review. The exception to the standard
came about with respect to tax shelter activity. The IRS policy approach
was modified in 200210 to direct IRS agents to exercise less restraint and
routinely request tax accrual work papers in connection with tax shelter
activity-in the case of "listed" or substantially similar transactions. 3'
A "listed transaction" is defined as "a transaction that is the same as
or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction
and identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as
a listed transaction. 32 A subsequent section in the regulation provides:
A taxpayer has participated in a listed transaction if the taxpayer's tax
return reflects tax consequences or a tax strategy described in the published
guidance that lists the transaction under paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
A taxpayer also has participated in a listed transaction if the taxpayer
knows or has reason to know that the taxpayer's tax benefits are derived
directly or indirectly from tax consequences or a tax strategy described
in published guidance that lists a transaction under paragraph (b)(2) of
this section. Published guidance may identify other types or classes of
persons that will be treated as participants in a listed transaction.33
Listed transactions are one of six categories identified as "reportable
transactions" requiring a taxpayer to attach to its return for the taxation
year a disclosure statement in the prescribed form, in essence highlighting
the transaction to tax authorities and signaling that it might merit additional
scrutiny.
The IRS administrative direction as of July 19, 200414 followed
Announcement 2002-63 directing an agent to make a mandatory
Information Document Request (IDR) for tax accrual work papers "when
a taxpayer claims the benefit of a listed transaction for a return filed on or
after July 1, 2002, and for some returns filed before that date."35 IDRs are

29. Supra note 25.
30. Announcement 2002-63, online: <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/announcement_2002-63.pdf>.
See also Larry R. Langdon, Commissioner, Large and Mid-Size Business Division, and Joseph G.
Kehoe, Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, "Obtaining Tax Accrual Workpapers
Related to Abusive Tax Avoidance Transactions," undated (2002), online: <http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-utl/lmsb sbse memorandum.pdf>.
31. (defined in Treas. Reg. ss 1.6011-4).
32. Treas. Reg. Ss. 1-6011-4, section b(2).
33. Treas. Reg. Ss 1-6011-4, section c(3)(I)(A).
34. IRM 4.10.20, supra note 8.
35. Supra note 26.
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subject to review within the IRS, so some internal standard applies across
examination offices and ensures a level of consistency in interpretation
and application.
IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb commented during a July 16, 2004
roundtable discussion in Washington that the policy is designed to curb
tax shelter abuse by providing greater transparency to the tax return in
which benefits arising from the shelter transaction are reported, and that
"the policy makes taxpayers think twice before choosing to use a tax
shelter. 3 6 Korb also commented that all attorney-client privilege defenses
to summonses for tax accrual work papers will be "flushed out" and that
the marketplace will react by avoiding abusive shelters which would
attract difficulties. 37 The common practice is to negotiate audit work paper
access at the start of the audit, but, as noted above, IRS agents have little
room for discretion under the rules when it comes to tax accrual work
papers. At the roundtable, IRS Chief Counsel Korb confirmed that "in
virtually every instance in which a request for tax accrual work papers
is allowed, it is mandatory that the agent make one." The panel agreed,
though, that the IRS "weapon" of summonses would only work effectively
as a disincentive to future shelter activity if the IRS continued its "policy
of restraint."38
Finally, the consensus of the panel at the roundtable regarding the
use of attorney-client privilege claims to resist disclosure was that workproduct doctrine may protect work papers from summons enforcement
and that litigation over the issue would centre around the remoteness of
any connection between the preparation of the work papers and possible
litigation. 39 This remains relevant in the consideration of the practical
impact of any Canadian efforts to minimize restraint in seeking disclosure
from accountants and auditors. It signals the legitimacy of the concern
that clients will turn to lawyers and the cloak of privilege unavailable to
accountants in Canada to address concerns about CRA's ability to penetrate
the accountant-client relationship.
It is important in this regard to note the differences between Canada
and the United States when it comes to privilege in respect of tax
working papers. There is no common law privilege for accountants in
the United States. A limited form of statutory privilege was extended in
1998 to communications between taxpayers and "federally authorized tax

36. George Jones, "IRS Chief Counsels Debate Interim Guidance on Tax Accrual Workpapers;
Shakeout of Rules Anticipated," CCH News - News-Federal, 2004 TaxDAY (July 19, 2004).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
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practitioners" (FATPs). 4 ° It applies to communications that would have
been privileged had they been between taxpayer and attorney. In United

States v. Frederick,4 the court held that the scope of the tax practitionerclient privilege depends on the scope of the common law protections of
confidential attorney-client communications and can be no broader than
it. The FATP privilege is limited to IRS matters, and does not apply in
cases of fraud or criminal activity. Accordingly, determination of work
product privilege for attorneys has a bearing on the ability of accountants

and auditors to claim protection over communications with clients in the
audit context for IRS purposes. Given the IRS position of "self-restraint,"

extent of the FATP
with respect to work papers, however, it appears the
42
privilege will not need to be tested in the near term.
In the end, the U.S. policy of self-restraint and the 2004 and 2005
clarification and confirmation of the policy that IRS examiners should
only request audit or tax accrual work papers in "unusual circumstances"4 3
provides a model worthy of adoption by CRA. American approaches to

both capital markets reform and the operation of the tax system mirror
Canadian concerns for the efficient functioning of both. Concerns about
tax shelter abuse are dealt with through the implementation of a separate
regime of "listed transactions." The IRS approach strikes an appropriate
balance between disclosure and the need to encourage open communication
between clients and the professional advisors who play such an integral

part in the self-reporting system.44
2. Australia

Australia recognizes that the balance between disclosure and the free
flow of information between client and accountant or auditor needs to
be maintained with a view to encouraging full and frank disclosure. The

40. 26 U.S.C.A. ss. 7525.
41. 182 F. 3d 496 (715Cir. 1999).
42. The wisdom of privilege for both attorneys and accountants is being questioned in particular with
respect to claims made in the tax shelter context: see Richard Lavoie, "Making a List and Checking
It Twice: Must Tax Attorneys Divulge Who's Naughty and Nice?" (2004) 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
141 (arguing that on policy grounds, attorney-client privilege should be limited in the context of
tax planning). For a contrary view arguing for an extension, rather than contraction, of privilege in
the tax context, see William R. Lawlor, "Extending Privilege to Accountants: Should We Follow the
American Lead?" 4:1 Report of Proceedingsof the Fiftieth Tax Conference, 1998 Conference Report
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999). For consideration of privilege and government authorities
in the US more generally: Lance Cole, "Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's MultiFront Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is Misguided)" (2003) 48 Vill. L. Rev.
469; Bruce A. Green and David C. Clifton, "Feeling a Chill," ABA Journal (December 2005) at 61.
43. Supra note 27.
44. For additional discussion of legislative and administrative efforts to curtail tax shelter abuse in
the United States, see Marvin A. Chirelstein and Lawrence A. Zelenak, "Tax Shelters and the Search
forA Silver Bullet" (2005) 105(6) Colum. L. Rev. 1939.
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Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has articulated a "concession" to the
accounting profession that has the effect of circumscribing what the ATO
claims would otherwise be its relatively unfettered access to documents
of the client of an accounting firm. In a September 2003 speech, a
senior ATO official said that the "concession" did not have "the same
standing as a fundamental common law right or privilege as does legal
professional privilege" and that in certain situations, "the Commissioner
will [nonetheless] authorize tax officers to obtain access to relevant
documents. '45 The rationale for the concession he articulated is critical.
The overall approach reflects the
Commissioner's acceptance that there is a certain class of document
which should remain confidential in all but the most exceptional of
circumstances. It is an acknowledgement that taxpayers should be able
to discuss their various financial options in a full and frank manner
with professional accounting advisors - thereby assisting those in need
of independent and professional advice to cope with the demands
and
46
intricacies of their rights and obligations under the tax system.
The ATO's official statement of the "accountant's concession" is set out
in a March 2005 document entitled "Guidelines to Accessing Professional
Accounting Advisor's Papers."47 The Introduction to those Guidelines
formally incorporates the rationale described above:
While recognizing that the Commissioner has the legislative power to
request access to most documents, it is accepted that there is a class of
documents which should, in all but exceptional circumstances, remain
within the confidence of taxpayers and their professional accounting
advisors. In respect of such documents the ATO acknowledges that
taxpayers should be able to consult with their professional accounting
advisors on a confidential basis in respect of their rights and obligations
under taxation laws to enable full and frank discussion to take place and
for advice to be communicated on that basis.
These guidelines describe how that acknowledgement applies in practice.
They are an administrative concession and will be adhered to by ATO
offices provided that taxpayers and their professional accounting advisors
use these guidelines in the spirit in which they were formulated.48

45. Michael D'Ascenzo, Second Commissioner of Taxation, "Balancing Individual Interests and
Community Needs - A Focus on Legal Professional Privilege," Address to the Australian Italian
Lawyers Association Tax Seminar, Melbourne, Australia, 18 September 2003, online: <http://www.
ato.gov.au/print.asp?doc+/content/37818.htm>.
46. Ibid.
47. Online: <http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/51665.htm>.
48. Ibid.
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The concession is exercised according to the administrative directions
contained in the ATO Access Manual, revised as of March 14, 2005
and now publicly available. 49 The guidelines define three categories of
documents. These are:
(1) Source documents, such as ledgers, journals, balance sheets and profit
and loss accounts and tax working papers. The ATO claims full and
free access to all of these documents.
(2) Restricted source documents, which are advice papers created prior to
or contemporaneously with a transaction or arrangement. The ATO
states in its guidelines that it will only seek access to these documents
in exceptional circumstances, such as:
* Suspicion of fraud, evasion or other offences
* The taxpayer's source documents have been lost or destroyed, or
are otherwise unavailable or are not made available, and the ATO
cannot otherwise obtain sufficient information
* The source documents do not provide sufficient information for
the ATO to properly evaluate a taxpayer's arrangements
(3) Non-source documents. These may include advice provided after a
transaction had been completed which does not affect the recording
of the transaction in the accounts or tax return.
A taxpayer must make a claim for the concession to apply with respect to
restricted source and non-source documents.5" The ATO has stated publicly
that it has only applied the "exceptional circumstances" criteria to override
the concession on four occasions.
Chapter 07 of the ATO Access Manual, entitled "Access to Professional
Accounting Advisor's Papers," details and references the guidelines under
which ATO officials may seek access to "restricted source" documents
(which are described as "advice documents shedding light on transactions")
and "non-source documents." The chapter reiterates the overarching
policy direction quoted in the first paragraph of the Guidelines above. It
also notes that the Guidelines also apply "only to documents prepared by
external accounting advisors who are independent of the taxpayer." This
is to be distinguished from a situation where advice documents are created
by officers within an organization.
However, even those documents may merit considerable protection
from disclosure to ATO officials. Chapter 7.15 signals that the ATO clearly

49. Online: <http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=content/51010.htm> [Guidelines].
50. Ibid.
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understands the link between corporate governance priorities and tax
disclosure:
The Tax Office recognizes the benefits of increased involvement by
company boards in assessments of tax risk, particularly when it occurs
in an environment of candour and open discussion among directors and
their advisors. Company board involvement on that basis is expected to
promote rigour in tax assessments. For this reason, in 2004 the ATO is

developing a practice statement on access to documents of companies'
boards concerning tax risk assessments of the company's systems,
processes or major transactions or arrangements. Tax officers should
have regard to this statement once published in deciding how to deal
with access to such board tax risk documents."
The Guidelines reiterate that access by ATO officials to the restricted

classes of documents from a company's external accounting advisors
is only in exceptional circumstances; further, access is only available
when written approval is sought from and granted by designated ATO
(SES) officials, building in review, management supervision, procedural
fairness and national consistency. Australian courts have confirmed that
the application of the guidelines to the accountants' "concession" gives
rise to an entitlement of procedural fairness or natural justice in their
application.5 2
The ATO Commissioner has taken a pragmatic view of the application
of the concession, honouring the spirit of the statement that taxpayers need

to consult with their accounting advisors on a confidential basis, while at
the same time ensuring that the ATO has sufficient access to the requisite
documents it needs to permit its tax audit work to continue:
In those cases where the Accounting Advisors' concession is claimed
and we are unable to ascertain from the documents which have been

provided the facts necessary to determine the taxation consequences of
the particular transactions or arrangements then this will be considered
'exceptional circumstances' resulting in the removal of the concession.
Likewise, where the law requires a determination of the purpose for
which a transaction or arrangement is entered into and this cannot be
ascertained from the documents provided, then this would amount to
'exceptional circumstances' allowing the lifting of the concession. I am

prepared to consider appropriate and timely arrangements for segregating
any advice component from the factual information we are seeking. 3
51. Ibid., s. 7.5. Note: At time of writing, this statement is not yet publicly available.
52. See Deloitte Touche Tomhatsu v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxtion (1998), 98 A.T.C. 5192;
(1998), 40 ATR 435; and ONE.TEL Ltd. v. Deputy Commissionerof Taxation (2001), 101 F.C.R. 548;
[2000] ATC 4,229.

53. Guidelines, supra note 49, Chapter 7.10, quoting from " A Question of Balance," address by
Michael Carmody, Australian Commissioner of Taxation, to the American Club, Sydney, NSW,
Australia, 17 September 1999.
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The Australian Federal Court has also considered the issue of the
privilege to be accorded third party advice. In Pratt Holdings and Anor
v. FCT5 4 it extended privilege to accountants' documents even where the
accountant was not directly acting as the taxpayer's agent in dealing with
the taxpayer's lawyers. In that case, the taxpayer had requested advice
from its accountants which it required in order to provide instructions to
its lawyers. The lawyers had suggested that the taxpayer obtain a valuation
of assets and other independent accounting advice in relation to the
quantification of particular losses.
During the course of an audit, the ATO wrote to the taxpayer's
accountants seeking access to certain documents over which the accountants
claimed privilege as they had been prepared in relation to the request from
the lawyers. At first instance the trial judge rejected the claim of privilege
over the accountants' advice because the accountants were not the agent of
the taxpayer in making the communication to the taxpayer's lawyers.
On appeal, the Court focused on the function performed by the
accountants rather than the formalities of the legal relationship. The Court
recognized the need for taxpayers to rely on experts to assist in instructing
legal counsel where commercial arrangements are complex. It held that the
function performed by the accountants in creating the documents for the
taxpayer was to enable the taxpayer to make the necessary communication
with its lawyers to obtain legal advice. Accordingly, the Court found, legal
professional privilege extended over the documents the accountants had
created. 5 Even though not akin to the FATP privilege in the United States,
the decision constitutes an important recognition of the need for further
protection of the confidential relationship between accountant and client
in the advisory context. It emphasized the functionality of the linkage and
the need for professional advice rather than the strict form by which that
56
advice was provided.
Thus, Australia also provides an important model for Canadian
consideration in its categorization of working papers. Further, the model
recognizes that self-restraint on the part of taxation authorities is required
to sustain an atmosphere conducive to disclosure and confidentiality
which is required for capital markets to function. Clearly, the concession
itself and the administrative guidelines under which it will be extended
54. [2004] FCAFC 122, reversing Commissionerof Taxation v PrattHoldings, [2003] FCA 6.
55. See also the discussion of the decision and the difficulties in respect of the privilege determination
in both Canada and Australia in Susan Van Der Hout, "Third-Party Privilege," 13(5) Canadian Tax
Highlights (May 2005) at 1-2.
56. For a further discussion of legal professional privilege and the disparity in treatment between
legal and non-legal advisors in the provision of tax advice, see Rodney Fisher, "Confidential tax
communication: A right or a privilege?" (2005) 20(4) Australian Tax Forum 555.
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and preserved, highlight that the concession is extended in a spirit of
cooperation that needs to be honored by both taxation officials and by
taxpayers (and their advisors) themselves. Self-restraint is extended on
those conditions. Unlike in Canada, Australian officials have seen the
wisdom, in the broader context, of such treatment.
3. United Kingdom
The situation in the United Kingdom parallels that in the United States
and in Australia: tax authorities have broad authority to access working
paper documents, but have chosen to exercise that authority in limited
circumstances. Sections 20A and 20B of the Taxes ManagementAct 197057
provide authority for the United Kingdom Inland Revenue (IR) to require
access to documents that contain or which may contain information relevant
to tax liability. There is an exception to the requirement regarding a tax
advisor's documents where the documents relate to a pending appeal,58
or where the documents are the advisor's own property and consist of
communications for the purpose of giving or receiving tax advice. 9 This
exception can be circumvented, however, where the client has a copy of
the tax advisor's document and the request is made to the client rather than
the advisor.
Should a taxpayer or its advisors object to an IR request and a
"compromise" cannot be reached, the IR can ask tax commissioners to
rule on whether the request is reasonable and whether the taxpayer should
comply. The IR exercises its power to obtain documents and records from
third parties "relatively sparingly." Where the IR chooses to exercise its
ultimate power to seize documents it must follow strict procedures in
doing so, including the procurement of a warrant from the appropriate
judicial authority.
Historically, IR rarely sought access to accountants' working papers for
large corporate taxpayers, even though under the powers described above
IR arguably has authority to seek relevant information from third parties.
In Statement of Practice 5/90, Inland Revenue confirmed this restraint:
Accountants' working papers will not be called for on a routine basis.
The Revenue will normally do so in connection with enquiries into a
client's tax affairs only where they have been unable to satisfy themselves
otherwise that the client's accounts or returns are complete or correct.
Although the new provisions give the Revenue formal powers to require
access to accountants' working papers, this has been given in the past
57. Taxes Management Act 1970 (U.K.) c. 9, Pt III (Other Returns and Information, Production of
Accounts, Books and Other Information) [TMA].
58. Ibid., s. 20B(2).
59. Ibid., s. 20B(9(b)).
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on a voluntary basis where appropriate. The Revenue will continue their
general policy of seeking access on a voluntary basis and will use
their
60
formal powers only where they consider it absolutely necessary.
In practice, then, Inland Revenue does not seek access to auditor or
accountant working papers. 6' Reforms in 2004 aimed at curbing tax shelter
abuse have instead focused on pre-implementation disclosure. The United
Kingdom has recently addressed concerns of abuse through means other
than working paper disclosure, although attorney-client privilege remains
a particular concern even with the new rules.
On March 17, 2004, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced new
rules to require promoters and users of certain tax arrangements to disclose
details of those arrangements to Inland Revenue. In addition to legislative
provisions contained in a finance bill, on May 17, Inland Revenue published
for consultation three draft regulations. The consultation period ended on
June 30 and the final text of the regulations was published on July 9. The
rules thereafter became law and, by early October 2004, the scheme was
fully in place.62
The rules are designed to alert Inland Revenue to certain types of tax
planning strategies at an early stage. The "Promoter" - the person who
markets or designs a "notifiable" arrangement - is responsible at first
instance for making the notification but, if there is no U.K. promoter,
the taxpayer is required to make the disclosure. To be "notifiable" the
arrangements must enable a person to obtain a tax advantage by saving
or deferring U.K. corporation tax, income tax or capital gains tax, and
obtaining such a tax advantage must be one of the main benefits expected
to arise from the arrangements. The "disclosure information" is made on
a standard Inland Revenue form, requires no client specific identification,

60. Statement of Practice 5/90 (Accountants' Working Papers), in Inland Revenue (U.K.), Statements
of Practice (issued up to August 31, 2004), online: <http://www.hmrc.gov. uk/practitioners/sop.pdf">.
61. See TMAsupra note 57, s. 20B(9)(a), setting out that a notice to provide documents under Section
20(3) or (8A) "does not oblige a person who has been appointed as an auditor for the purposes of any
enactment to deliver or make available documents which are his property and were created by him or
on his behalf for or in connection with the performance of his functions under that enactment."
62. See FinanceAct 2004 (U.K.) c. 12, Pt 7, ss. 306-317 [Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes];
see also The Tax Avoidance Schemes (Promoters and PrescribedCircumstances) Regulations 2004,
SI 2004-1865, online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk /si/2004-1865.pdf >; The Tax Avoidance Schemes
(PrescribedDescriptions of Arrangements) Regulations 2004, S1 2004-1863, online: <http://www.
hmrc.gov uk/si/2004-1863.pdf>; The Tax Avoidance Schemes (Information) Regulations 2004, S1
2004-1864 online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/si/2004-1865.pdf >; all in force August 1, 2004; and
The Tax Avoidance Schemes (PrescribedDescriptions of Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations,
S12004-2429 online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/aiu/prescribed-arrangements-amemt.pdf> in force
30 September 2004; and The Tax Avoidance Schemes (Promoters Prescribed Circumstances and
Information) (Amendment) Regulations, S1 2004-2613, online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/si/20042613.pdf., in force 14 October 2004.
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and should be sufficient to enable Inland Revenue to understand how the
arrangement is intended to operate. Once disclosed, the arrangement is
given a reference number and clients will be required to reference the
number on their tax returns for the first relevant return period and those
thereafter in which the tax advantage arises.
The scheme caused grave concerns for lawyers who believed that
the requirement to make disclosure in the form proposed would violate
privilege. The initial position of Inland Revenue was that there would be
no exemption for legal professionals. However, by late September, the
Law Society of England and Wales advised its members that they were
protected by legal professional privilege from reporting their clients' tax
affairs. On September 30, 2004, Inland Revenue agreed. On October 1,
2004, the Financial Times of London reported that Inland Revenue and
the Law Society of England and Wales had hammered out a concession to
the regulatory reporting requirements. 63 The concession agreement would
require changes to the legislation and would make clients, rather than
their lawyers, responsible for reporting their tax plans. The Association
of Chartered Certified Accountants and the Consultative Committee of
Accountancy Bodies claimed that the concession could undermine the
disclosure regime and would provide lawyers with an unfair advantage in
seeking and obtaining tax planning work from clients, particularly as the
accountant's privilege would not similarly exempt accountants.
In 1989, Parliament had extended a limited form of privilege to
accountants, acting upon recommendations arising from the 1983 Keith
Committee's wide-ranging review of the enforcement powers of both
Inland Revenue and HM Customs & Excise. Amendments to the Taxes
Management Act 19 70 ' attempted to ensure that Inland Revenue would
not be able to obtain from the tax agent details of tax advice which had been
given by the agent to the taxpayer. The Keith Committee had commented
on the difficulty of affording different treatment to the advice given by
solicitors on tax matters as opposed to advice given by other tax agents
(including accountants); these amendments were an effort to "level the
playing field."
For lawyers, section 20B(8) of the TMA provides that a demand by
Inland Revenue under the Act "does not oblige a barrister, advocate or
a solicitor to deliver or make available, without his client's consent, any
63. Vanessa Houlder, "Accountants critical of Revenue deal with lawyers", Financial Times of
London, 1 October 2004, p. 2; see also FinancialAdviser, "Solicitors under no obligation to reveal
advice to Revenue," 30 September 2004; Roland Gribben, "Brown 'will not delay' on tax laws," The
Daily Telegraph, 30 September 2004, p. 1; and Asset Finance International, "UK law firms object to
new disclosure regime," 2 October 2004.
64. Supra note 57, s. 20B(9)-(l 1).
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document with respect to which a claim to professional privilege could be
maintained" [the "lawyer's privilege"]. Section 20B(9), [the "accountant's
privilege"], provides that such an Inland Revenue demand
(a) does not oblige a person who has been appointed as an auditor for
the purposes of any enactment to deliver or make available documents
which are his property and were created by him or on his behalf for or in
connection with the performance of his functions under that enactment,
and
(b) does not oblige a tax adviser to deliver or make available documents
which are his property and consist of relevant communications.

"Relevant communications" are defined in section 20B(10) as:
communications between the tax adviser and a.

a person in relation to whose tax affairs he has been appointed, or

b.

any other tax adviser of such a person,

the purpose of which is the giving or obtaining of advice about any of
those tax affairs

The precise ambit of the privilege afforded by the Act is still subject
to some uncertainty. In 2003, the House of Lords rejected an effort by
Inland Revenue to obtain from a client's legal advisors documents that
Inland Revenue had been unable to obtain from the client directly.65 Inland
Revenue had argued that its information powers overrode the protection
afforded by the common law principle of legal professional privilege. The
House of Lords rejected this view, holding that privilege could only be
trumped by clearly stated statutory provisions or by necessary implication,
after construing the statute as a whole. Audit working papers may become
part of this debate as the impact of the decision is felt but, as a practical
matter, IR does not often seek to review all audit working papers and
judicial guidance in this respect is unlikely.
In summary, the situation in the United Kingdom in essence parallels
that in the United States; there is statutory authority permitting wideranging inquiries for working papers, and a well developed policy of
"self-restraint" in exercising that authority only in unusual circumstances.
Further, akin to the United States situation, a limited form of statutory
privilege for accountants exists, and the extent of common law privilege
for lawyers needs to be considered in the context of any reform. Concerns
65.

R. (Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd.) v. Special Commissioner of lncome Tax, [2003] 1 A.C. 563.

376 The Dalhousie Law Journal

over the disclosure of possible abuse of the tax system have been addressed
in 2004 not through administrative changes to this approach, but rather via
an open and transparent regulatory effort to require disclosure about client
tax plans in advance of their implementation. This has itself presented
concerns about the ability to circumvent the regulatory intention through
the use of lawyers rather than accountants as tax advisors.
4. New Zealand
On November 16, 2004, New Zealand Finance Minister Michael Cullen
introduced legislation extending to tax advisors, such as chartered
accountants, the statutory privilege currently protecting the advice
lawyers give their clients. 66 The proposed changes had been announced
67
on September 14, 2004 and followed a lengthy period of consultation.
Under the amendments, passed on June 15, 2005,68 a new section 20B
of the Tax Administration Act 1994 introduces a non-disclosure right
for certain communications between tax advisors and their clients. To
qualify for the right, the taxpayer's advisor needs to be a member of an
advisor group approved by New Zealand Inland Revenue. 69 Documentary
communication between tax advisors and their clients will be protected if
the "main purpose" for the creation of the document is to give or receive
tax advice on tax laws, but a claim of non-disclosure on the grounds
that a document is a "tax advice document" must be asserted under the
rules governing the claims process. The non-disclosure right is subject
to exclusions "relating to information of a factual nature, accounting
and tax work papers, non-tax advice such as valuation and investment
advice, matters relating to debt recovery and matters concerning illegal
or wrongful acts."70 "Tax work papers" are not defined in the legislation;
rather, the scheme differentiates between "tax advice," which is protected,
66. Taxation (Base Maintenance and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 16 November 2004, online:
<http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/filesIbills/23 Ibarl .pdf> [NZ Bill]; see also Hon Dr.
Michael Cullen, Minister of Finance, Minister of Revenue (NZ), Taxation (Base Maintenance and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, Commentary on the Bill, 16 November 2004, online: <http://www.
taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/files/novbill04comm.pdf'> [NZ Bill Commentary].
67. See Hon Dr. Michael Cullen, "Statutory privilege for legal advice extended," Media Statement,
14 September 2004, Inland Revenue Department, New Zealand, Policy Advice Division, online:
<http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/index.php?view=320>; also Hon. Dr. Michael Cullen, "Address to
ICANZ 2004," Speech Notes, 15 October 2004, Inland Revenue Department, New Zealand, Policy
Advice Division, online: <http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/index.phpview=320>; see also Annabel
Young, "Operational and Policy Issues," 83(9) Chartered Accountants Journal of New Zealand, I
October 2004.
68. The Taxation (Base Maintenanceand Miscellaneous Provisions)Act 2005 [2005 No. 79], supra
note 4, passed through Parliament on 15 June 2005 and received Royal Assent on June 21, 2005. See
ss. 119-122.
69. Ibid., s. 122 (inserting 20B(4)&(5)). Chartered Accountants are such an advisor group.
70. NZ Bill, supra note 59, Explanatory note, p. 10; see also NZ Act, supra note 24, ss. 20B(2) and
20D.
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and "tax contextual information," which must be disclosed.7' Under the
new scheme, the right of non-disclosure must be claimed in writing, and
factual information (such as a brief description of the document, the name
of the author and the date the document was created) will need to be
provided to the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department (IRD) by way
of a statutory declaration, either by the taxpayer or by the tax advisor on
the taxpayer's behalf.72
In introducing the proposals in a 2002 discussion document, the New
Zealand government noted that the existing lawyer-client privilege, as
the main exception to the IRD's information-gathering powers, had been
identified in a number of reports as "causing difficulties in the administration
of the tax system."73 In implementing the new rules, which would apply to
both lawyers and other tax practitioners, including chartered accountants,
the document noted:
The new rules should improve Inland Revenue's access to factual
information and, therefore, assist the enforcement of the Inland Revenue
Acts. At the same time, the new rules should promote the efficient
conduct of compliance with the tax laws by allowing or continuing 7to4
allow tax practitioners to have a candid relationship with their clients.
Further, the document provided:
Voluntary compliance with the tax system could suffer if there is a
perception that some taxpayers are able to use the current privilege
system to conceal details of their true income and therefore avoid or
evade payment of tax. A reduction in voluntary compliance increases the
tax burden for those taxpayers who continue to comply with the law.
Another disadvantage of the current privilege system is that it provides
lawyers with a competitive advantage over other tax advisers. Privilege
may be claimed for tax advice from a lawyer when advice of exactly the
same nature provided by a chartered accountant is not privileged.75
In introducing the reforms that implement a new privilege scheme, the
New Zealand government similarly recognizes that candour between client
and professional advisor, including accountants and auditors, is critical to
the integrity of the tax system. The commentary to the bill introducing the
71. NZ Act, supra note 24, s. 20F(3).
72. NZ Act, supra note 24, s. 20D.
73. Hon Dr. Michael Cullen, Minister of Finance, Minister of Revenue, "Tax and privilege: a
proposed new structure," Policy Advice Division, New Zealand Inland Revenue Department, May
2002, para. 1.2, online: <http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/files/taxprivdd.pdf'> [NZ
Discussion Document].
74. Ibid.atpara. 1.3.
75. Ibid.at paras. 2.14, 2.15.
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reforms noted that accountants are central to the administration of the tax
system and, while a blanket extension of legal professional privilege to
accountants was not warranted:
Accountants should, however, also be able to give candid and independent
advice to their clients, as lawyers do, without the need to disclose that
advice to Inland Revenue. The benefit of enabling this to occur is that
the advice can promote voluntary compliance by taxpayers with the
tax system and give rise to a consequent reduction in compliance and
administrative costs.76
The New Zealand extension of a form of statutory privilege to afford
protection to the advice passing between accountant and client on tax
matters is clearly designed to facilitate the effective functioning of a selfreporting tax system and to narrow the gap in treatment between accountants
and lawyers. This is consistent with steps taken in the United States,
Australia and the United Kingdom. It reinforces the merit of the policy
goal of "efficient conduct of compliance with the tax laws by allowing or
continuing to allow tax practitioners to have a candid relationship with
their clients. 77
III. The Canadiancontext: Kitsch and the problem ofprivilege
In considering the appropriate response to the problem of recasting access
to working papers by CRA officials in an era of transparency in financial
reporting and corporate governance, consideration needs to be given to
privilege. Here, too, Canada's response is out of step with developments
in the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.
Apart from the absence of even a limited form of statutory privilege for
accountants in the tax system, a July 2003 decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal interpreted the ability of CRA, under section 231.2 of the Income
Tax Act, to question accountants in an extraordinarily intrusive way about
their clients'subjective intentions. Without a form of voluntary self-restraint
by CRA along the lines exhibited by IRS officials in the United States after
the decision in Arthur Young,7" the end result from a client perspective will
76. NZ Bill Commentary, supra note 66 at 44. Note that the New Zealand law on legal professional
privilege protects from disclosure facts about a transaction that are referred to in communications
between a lawyer and a client. As originally proposed, the new structure would have changed this
- no facts contained in communications between a lawyer and a client on tax matters, including facts
referred to in a lawyer's advice given on a transaction, would be privileged outside litigation. The
NZ Bill as introduced backed away from this position and the amendments thus do not affect legal
professional privilege and communications between lawyers and clients on tax matters - both the
advice and the factual underpinnings thereof- are protected from disclosure. The contours of solicitorclient privilege in Canada with respect to facts are not as broad as the legal professional privilege is
conceived in New Zealand.
77. NZ Discussion Document, supra note 73 at para. 1.3.
78. Young, supra note 25.
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be a race to privilege - to lawyers - and a reluctance by clients to disclose
information to their auditors and accountants, with a consequent impact on
the availability of information to the capital markets.
There are two critical components of the decision in Kitsch.79 The first
is the interpretation of the scope of the powers granted to CRA in section
231.2 of the Income Tax Act permitting comprehensive demands for
documentary disclosure and interrogatories of accountants. The second is
the Court's finding that there is no policy rationale supporting privilege for
communications between clients and their tax accountants who provide
them with advice in the course of a professional relationship. This is even
after the court reviewed the United States extension of the FATP privilege to
accountants for IRS purposes. The signal from the Court is that legislative
intervention, rather than an extension of the common law, is necessary to
extend privilege categories to accountants. As a result, the onus falls back
upon CRA (or indeed the Department of Finance) to consider the change
both for purposes of the tax system, and for the broader relationship to
corporate governance reform.
Section 231.2 of the Income Tax Act provides the government with
broad powers to require "any person" to provide information or documents
"for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement" of the
Act.80 Kitsch put the breadth of the power under section 231.2 squarely
in issue. In particular, the question was whether the language of section
231.2 mandated that taxpayers' accountants provide answers to written
questions from the Minister of National Revenue (MNR) about the
subjective intention and purposes of transactions into which the taxpayers
had entered. Three taxpayers (Kitsch, Tower, and Tower) were moving
from Canada, and BDO Dunwoody, a firm of chartered accountants,
provided them with advice about transactions into which they could enter
in order to create interest deductions to offset the effect of the departure
tax. The exact nature of the transactions was not discussed in the judgment.
The taxpayers implemented the transactions and the initial assessment of
their returns allowed the interest deductions they had claimed. The MNR
subsequently requested information regarding the deductions; BDO
79.
80.

Kitsch, supra note 3.
Section 231.2 (1) reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Minister may, subject to subsection
(2), for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of this Act, including the
collection of any amount payable under this Act by any person, by notice served personally
or by registered or certified mail, require that any person provide, within such reasonable
time as is stipulated in the notice,
a) any information or additional information, including a return of income or a
supplementary return; or
b) any document.
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Dunwoody responded but did not provide all the information sought. The
taxpayers were reassessed, and the interest deductions were disallowed.
The MNR then served Requirements under section 231.2(1) of
the Income Tax Act on BDO Dunwoody. The Requirements were
comprehensive and demanded "production of numerous documents,
including all tax files, planning documents, working paper files,
permanent files, records, minutes or note of all conversations or meetings,
detailed billings, detailed telephone records, promotional material, and
correspondence relating to the taxpayers." In addition, the Requirements
demanded that two BDO accountants answer a number of questions
designed to elicit facts within the accountants' knowledge about the
taxpayers' subjective intentions in entering into the transactions that
gave rise to the interest deduction that the MNR had disallowed for the
taxpayers' 1997 and 1998 returns. The taxpayers and BDO Dunwoody
challenged the Requirements, arguing that the statute did not permit such
an expansive set of demands by the tax authorities.
At trial, the Court found that section 231.2 of the Act gave the MNR the
right to demand the documents but not the answers to the interrogatories.
The Federal Court of Appeal said the trial judge erred in doing so, and that
section 231.2 is framed sufficiently broadly to permit interrogatories of
accountants. It held that the requirement to provide "any information" in
section 231.2(1)(a) means that the MNR is entitled both to documents and
to ask questions of the taxpayers and their accountants to elicit knowledge
or facts about the transactions, including the purpose or intention behind
them. No appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In addition to the obvious ramifications for the relationship between
accountants and their clients, and the difficulties the decision poses for
taxpayers' privacy interests and their choice in professional advisors,
the real import of the decision is on the question of privilege. As a
practical matter, the shield against the legislative power in section 231
of the Act lies in privilege, something, as yet, unavailable to clients of
accountants in Canada. While a 1982 decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada made it clear that in Canadian law privilege, in addition to being
an evidentiary rule, is a "substantive rule of law"'" that permanently
privileges tax planning documents if the documents are within the scope
and extent of privilege established according to common law principles.

81. Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860; see also Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R.209 (describing privilege as " a principle of fundamental justice"
and "a civil right of supreme importance in Canadian law"); see also Mahmud Jamal and Brian
Morgan, "The Constitutionalization of Solicitor-Client Privilege" (2003) 20 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d)
213.
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What this means for practical purposes is that privilege does not solely
arise when CRA is seeking documents or information in the context of
judicial proceedings, but at all times (including an investigative stage
such as an audit). Accordingly, the impact on accountants acting as tax
advisors and auditors will be significant. It thus begs the question, as New
Zealand authorities posed, whether differential treatment of accountants
and lawyers is warranted.
A senior partner from KPMG made this point to the Canadian Tax
Foundation in 1998:
It is completely illogical that a taxpayer who seeks tax advice from two
widely recognized and competent tax advisers should have privileged
communications with one, but not the other, solely because one is a
lawyer and the other is not. Surely taxpayers' rights and the requirement
of a fair justice system dictate that privilege over tax advice should not
be governed by the profession to which the tax adviser belongs.82
The Federal Court ofAppeal in Kitsch was, however, unmoved by arguments
about the role accountants play in the tax system, or by the existence of the
FATP privilege for accountants in the United States. Writing for the full
panel, Mr. Justice Malone concluded that "no overriding policy consideration
exists so as to elevate the advice given by tax accountants to the level of
solicitor-client privilege."83 The Court rejected both a class privilege for
accountants and a "case-by-case" privilege recognized by the application
of the Wigmore principles to determine whether communications ought
to be privileged in the circumstances before the court.84 The relationship
of accountants and clients was not, the court held, one which needed to
be "sedulously fostered." In the Court's words, "[w]hile confidentiality
may be preferred, the tax accountant-client relationship is in no way as
fundamental to society and the administration of justice as the solicitor'85
client relationship.
Acknowledging the 1998 United States legislation creating the FATP
privilege as a "matter of policy interest," the Court concluded that "it is
of no consequence to the task at hand," and "[in] addition, a review of
the content of that legislation undoubtedly reveals that enactment of the

82. Lawlor, supra note 42 at 4:1.
83. Kitsch, supra note 3 at para. 38.
84. See R. v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263 at 289-290 for discussion of the case-by-case approach.
The Federal Court of Appeal had held previously in Baron v. Canada, [1991] 1 F.C. 668 that an
accountant-client privilege did not exist in relation to advice given by an accountant in respect of
search and seizure provisions in the Income Tax Act, and the court in Kitsch considered both whether
a class privilege ought to be recognized (contra Baron) or whether the case-by-case assessment would
result in privilege being acknowledged in the circumstances before it.
85. Kitsch, supra note 3 at para. 43.
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class privilege for accountants is better left with Parliament. 8 6 Though
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Gruenke8 7 had written that nothing
"precludes the identification of a new class on a principled basis" and that
the law of privilege "may evolve to reflect the social and legal realities of
our time," the Federal Court of Appeal clearly signaled that any such move
would be the prerogative of the legislature rather than the Court. This was
in spite of (and without comment upon) the argument of counsel for the
taxpayers that:
the social and legal reality in Canada today is that professional tax
accountants provide the bulk of tax advice to Canadians. They do so
in the expectation that their communications with their clients will
be confidential. They provide the same tax advice on the same law
concerning the same issues that tax lawyers provide and perform the
same legal analysis to the same facts that tax lawyers do. In determining
whether a communication should be subject to a class privilege, the
focus should be on the type of advice given and the context in which it
is given,88 and not on the name of the degree held by the person giving the
advice .
The New Zealand legislation of June 2005 was crafted in the context
of corporate governance reform post-Enron. Together with the United
States and Australian approaches, this should signal to Parliament that
reconsideration of the extension of a form of privilege to accountants is
warranted.89
Conclusion
In its 1997 decision in Hercules Managements Ltd.9' the Supreme Court of
Canada quoted with approval a passage from its earlier decision in Haig v.
Bamford 9'about the importance of the work of the accounting profession
in corporate governance:

86. Kitsch, supra note 3 at para. 48.
87. Gruenke, supra note 84 at 289-290.
88. Kitsch, supra note 3 (Joel Nitikman, Factum of the Appellants).
89. Kitsch, supra note 3 at para. 48: "enactment of the class privilege for accountants is better left
with Parliament."
90. [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165 at para. 32.
91. Haig v. Bamford, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 466. Though the Supreme Court found that auditors owed a
prima facie duty of care in tort to shareholders of the corporation who claimed to have suffered losses
in reliance on faulty audited financial statements, it held that those prima facie duties were negated
by policy considerations and in particular a concern about exposing auditors of public companies to
"the possibility of indeterminate liability, since such a finding would imply that auditors owe a duty of
care to any known class of potential plaintiffs regardless of the purpose to which they put the auditors'
reports." Hercules,supra note 90 at para. 64.
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The increasing growth and changing role of corporations in modem
society has been attended by a new perception of the societal role of
the profession of accounting. The day when the accountant served only
the owner-manager of a company and was answerable to him alone has
passed. The complexities of modem industry combined with the effects
of specialization, the impact of taxation, urbanization, the separation
of ownership from management, the rise of professional corporate
managers, and a host of other factors, have led to marked changes in
the role and responsibilities of the accountant, and in the reliance which
the public must place upon his work. The financial statements of the
corporations upon which he reports can affect the economic interests of
the general public as well as of shareholders and potential shareholders.
This role has been amplified in the post-Enron environment and in investor
confidence reforms.92 CRA's current policy regarding the disclosure

of working papers, however, pits the tax system and capital markets
obligations of accountants against one another, to the detriment of both.
CRA's broad powers to question auditors and professional advisors about
their clients' subjective intentions and its ability to obtain access to audit
working papers are in essence creating a paradox; rather than accessing
more information, the consequence of CRA actions will be less information
for both capital markets and tax system purposes.
The issue is particularly significant in relation to audit working

papers. Recent developments in auditing standards require that more
information be kept in the working papers to justify audit opinions for
financial reporting purposes in capital markets. If CRA routinely seeks
access to accountants' and auditors' working papers, or there is the policy
and legislative opportunity for it to do so, clients will understandably be
reluctant to disclose information to their accounting and auditing advisors,

or to create a paper trail backing up assessments and judgments; that will
92. As a result, I have questioned whether the policy considerations relied upon by the Supreme
Court in Hercules might be revisited: see Paul D. Paton, "Rethinking the Role of the Auditor," in
Paul D. Paton, ed., Challenge and Change in Securities Regulation - 12th Queen " Annual Business
Law Symposium Proceedings(2005)[forthcoming, 2006]. Anita Anand has argued a similar position:
discussing the Hercules decision and Kripps v. Touche Ross (1997), 33 B.C.L.R. (3d) 254 (C.A.):
"... an authoritative judicial attempt to reconcile the two decisions would certainly be useful. The
post-Enron regulatory disposition towards heightened accountability of auditors will inevitably colour
such an analysis and leads one to question whether Hercules would be decided differently today."
Anita I. Anand, "The Regulation of Auditors After Enron," in Anita I. Anand & William F. Flanagan,
eds., Conflict of Interest in Capital Markets Structures, Queen s Annual Business Law Symposium
2003 (Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium, 2004) 197 at 213. See also J. Blackier and M.
Paskell-Mede, "Auditor Liability in Canada: The Past, Present and Future" (1999) 48 U.N.B.L.J. 65;
Poonam Puri and Stephanie Ben-lshai, "Proportionate Liability Under the CBCA in the Context of
Recent Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors in the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time?"
in Poonam Puri and Jeffrey Larsen, eds., CorporateGovernance and Securities Regulation in the 21st
Century (Toronto: Butterworths, 2004) at 127; see also Brian Cheffins, "Auditors' Liability in the
House of Lords: A Signal Canadian Courts Should Follow" (1991) 18 C.B.L.J. 118.
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have a direct and negative impact on the quality of the information available
to conduct the audit and hence on the information available to the capital
markets. Tax authorities in other countries have crafted a balance between
the various concerns of capital markets and tax authorities which CRA
officials would be wise to replicate, particularly as Canadian authorities
officially participate in efforts to cooperate with those authorities. CRA
has never provided justification for deviating from what appears to be the
development of an effective international standard for addressing the issue
of working papers.
As the international examples provided amply illustrate, a CRA policy
statement limiting requests for working papers to "unusual circumstances"
and otherwise confirming a policy of self-imposed restraint in the manner
articulated by the IRS in the United States would achieve a proper balance
between candour and confidentiality. Beyond a mere CRA administrative
pronouncement, however, international developments and the potential
ramifications of the decision in Kitsch warrant rethinking the current
Canadian approach to privilege for tax matters. By following the lead
of New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom in creating
legislation that recognizes a limited form of privilege for accountants,
Canada would bring its practice in line with the "social and legal reality"
of the role and relationships of chartered accountants. As a package,
both sets of reforms would accord with international developments and
the underlying logic animating them. Notwithstanding the fact that tax
authorities have the power to seek documents and information, a policy of
self-restraint can go a long way towards encouraging the open and frank
communication between auditors, accountants and their clients so critical
to the proper functioning of both the capital markets and the tax system
as a whole.

